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The International Court of Justice recently gave judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. 
The case concerned German state immunity from civil claims brought in Italian courts by victims of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by German armed forces during 
World War II. The Court offered a valuable clarification of the relationship between state immunity 
and jus cogens norms at customary international law. The conservative reasoning was thorough 
and extensive and the decision is likely to ossify the evolution of state immunity. 
I INTRODUCTION 
On 3 February 2012, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed down a long awaited 
contribution to the law of state immunity in its decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State.1 
The case concerned German state immunity from the jurisdiction of Italian courts in claims relating 
to serious violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) by German armed forces during World 
War II. The Court, in a majority judgment ripe with conservative orthodoxy, held that Germany was 
entitled to state immunity.2   
This is the first case in which the ICJ has directly confronted the question of state immunity. It is 
significant for three reasons. First, the Court employed a conservative approach to the relationship 
between state immunity and jus cogens norms and rejected the existence of an emerging exception 
to immunity in cases of serious violations of IHL. Second, the case is unique in that the Court 
  
* Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons) programme at Victoria University of Wellington. I would like to thank 
Alberto Costi for his generous support, supervision and time.    
1  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (Judgment) ICJ, 3 February 
2012 available online at International Court of Justice "Cases" <www.icj-cij.org> [Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State].  
2  Subject to context, "Court" refers to the majority.  
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undertook an extensive and detailed examination of state practice including decisions of municipal 
courts. Third, divergent conceptions of the role of the ICJ in international law were manifest in the 
contrasting methodology of the majority and dissenting judgments.  
This article will present and critique the judgment of the ICJ. To this end, Part II will introduce 
the concept and history of state immunity. Part III will outline the factual and legal matrix of the 
case, the arguments of the parties and the decision of the ICJ. Part IV will argue that, de lege lata, or 
what the law is, the majority reached a correct decision as to the current customary international law 
of state immunity. Moreover, it will argue that the majority did so by adopting an appropriately 
positivist methodology. On the matter of de lege ferenda, or what the law ought to be, Part V will 
contend that, as a matter of policy, it would be best if states came to recognise an exception to state 
immunity for serious breaches of jus cogens norms if there are no alternative avenues of redress. 
Part VI will argue that the development of this exception in state practice is unlikely given that the 
judgment has the potential to ossify the customary international law of state immunity. 
II STATE IMMUNITY: CONCEPT AND EVOLUTION 
Jurisdictional state immunity precludes the judiciary of one state from exercising jurisdiction in 
a legal claim to which another sovereign state is a party.3 State immunity is the immunity of the 
state itself as opposed to that of a state official.4 It is separate and distinct from the immunity of 
states from enforcement measures against them.5 It is also important to distinguish immunity from 
impunity and an acceptance of actions as lawful.6 This article will discuss state immunity in civil 
proceedings, but not the individual immunity of state officials in criminal proceedings.  
The rule of state immunity initially arose from the immunity of the sovereign;7 the King could 
not be sued in his own courts.8 With the development of the nation state, the fundamental principles 
of sovereign equality and independence came to govern interstate relations.9 State immunity derives 
  
3  Hazel Fox The Law of State Immunity (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 5. 
4  Katherine Reece Thomas and Joan Small "Human Rights and State Immunity: is there Immunity from Civil 
Liability for Torture?" (2003) 50 NILR 1 at 20.   
5  Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 724. 
6  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 at 25. 
7  Lorna McGregor "Torture and State Immunity: Deflecting Impunity, Distorting Sovereignty" (2007) 18 
EJIL 903 at 918.  
8  Second report on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, by Mr Sompong Sucharitkul, 
Special Rapporteur [1980] YILC 199, vol 2, pt 2 at [67].  
9  McGregor, above n 7, at 912.   
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from these principles; as captured by the maxim par in parem non habet imperium, an equal cannot 
have jurisdiction over an equal.10 
A Absolute Immunity 
State immunity was originally considered an absolute bar on the jurisdiction of one state over 
another.11 Absolute state immunity received its first judicial recognition in Schooner Exchange v 
McFaddon.12 Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court held that "one sovereign 
[is] in no respect amenable to another."13 This case provided a foundation for the acceptance of the 
absolute doctrine in other jurisdictions.14 The United Kingdom first affirmed the doctrine in The 
Parlement Belge.15     
B Restrictive Immunity 
State immunity is not a static doctrine and societal developments have resulted in doctrinal 
evolution.16 Of particular influence was the increased state activity in commercial transactions in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. This occurred in the context of a global commercial marketplace 
and the rise of a rights consciousness.17 States that were engaged in commercial transactions with 
private parties could shield themselves behind the absolute doctrine of state immunity. This created 
a pressing social concern that the doctrine could unfairly disadvantage private companies that 
transacted with states.18 As a result, a restrictive conception of state immunity developed.19 A 
  
10  Shaw, above n 5, at 697; Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008) at 325. 
11  Shaw, above n 5, at 701.   
12  Schooner Exchange v McFaddon 11 US 116 (1812).  
13  At 136.  
14  Fox, above n 3, at 204.  
15  The Parlement Belge [1880] 5 PD 197 (CA). This case concerned the immunity of a delivery ship owned 
and operated by the Belgium King in English waters. The initial decision to deny immunity on the ground 
that the ship was engaged in commercial activity was reversed on appeal by reason of the independence and 
dignity of states. See Ernest K Bankas The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits 
Against Sovereign States in Domestic Courts (Springer, Berlin, 2005) at [2.5.1] for the evolution of the 
absolute doctrine in the English Courts. 
16  Fox, above n 3, at 2. 
17  Rosanne Van Alebeek The Immunity of States and Their Officials in International Criminal Law and 
International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) at 47; Brownlie, above n 10, 
at 327. 
18  Leandro de Oliveira Moll "Al-Adsani v United Kingdom: State Immunity and Denial of Justice with respect 
to Violations of Fundamental Human Rights" (2003) 4 MJIL 561 at 566.   
19  Shaw, above n 5, at 701.  
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distinction was drawn between a state's acta de jure imperii, sovereign acts, and acta de jure 
gestionis, private or commercial acts. Immunity attached to acta de jure imperii, but not to acta de 
jure gestionis.20  
The restrictive doctrine is now solidified in practice,21 although a common definition of the 
precise distinction between the two categories remains elusive.22 The legislation of jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom,23 the United States,24 Australia,25 Pakistan,26 Canada,27 South 
Africa,28 Japan,29 Singapore,30 Israel,31 Argentina32 and Malaysia33 affirms the restrictive 
approach. While Ireland, Nigeria and Zimbabwe have not legislated on the issue, municipal judicial 
decisions indicate acceptance of the restrictive doctrine.34 Similarly, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal held in Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v Sutton that a state's commercial 
activities are no longer protected by immunity.35 The restrictive doctrine is also accepted in civil 
jurisdictions such as Italy, Germany, France and Spain.36 This general acceptance is reflected in the 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (UN 
  
20  Fox, above n 3, at 35. 
21  At 502; Sevrine Knuchel "State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens" (2011) 9 JIHR 149 at 150. 
22  Paul Christoph Bornkamm "State Immunity Against Claims Arising from War Crimes: The Judgment of the 
International Court of Justice in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State" (2012) 13 German LJ 773 at 779.  
23  State Immunity Act 1978 (UK). 
24  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 USC.  
25  Foreign State Immunities Act 1985 (Cth). 
26  State Immunity Ordinance (VI 1981).  
27  State Immunity Act RSC 1985 c 18.  
28  Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981. 
29  Act on the Civil Jurisdiction of Japan with respect to a Foreign State Law No 24 of 2009. 
30  State Immunity Act 19 of 1979.  
31  Foreign State Immunity Law 5769–2008. 
32  Law No 24 448 ADLA 1995 A 220. 
33  Immunities and Privileges Act 1984. 
34  Government of Canada v Employment Appeals Tribunal and Burke [1992] ILRM 325 (SC), 95 ILR 467; 
Kramer v Government of Kingdom of Belgium and Embassy of Belgium [1989] 1 CLRQ 126 (Nigeria CA), 
103 ILR 299; Baker McCormac (Private) Ltd v Government of Kenya [1983] 2 ZLR 72 (SC), 84 ILR 18. 
35  Governor of Pitcairn and Associated Islands v Sutton [1995] 1 NZLR 426 (CA) at 428.  
36  Fox, above n 3, at 223–230. 
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Convention), which was adopted without a vote and, although yet to enter into force, provides an 
exception to immunity for commercial acts.37 
The underlying justification of the restrictive doctrine is the same as that of the absolute 
doctrine. The principles of sovereign equality and independence require immunity with respect to 
sovereign acts but do not justify the same immunity with respect to non-sovereign commercial 
acts.38 Although state immunity manifests the principle of sovereign equality, it conflicts with the 
principle of territorial sovereignty and its corollary of territorial jurisdiction. Immunity derogates 
from territorial jurisdiction yet is an essential means by which sovereign equality of states is 
recognised.39  
C Contentious Exceptions   
State immunity has continued to contract in scope as the international legal order has evolved.40 
Beyond the restrictive doctrine, there is now a "twilight zone" containing further, contentious, 
exceptions to the absolute principle.41 Two such exceptions relevant to the discussion of the case 
before the ICJ are the territorial tort exception and an exception for violation of jus cogens norms. 
1 The territorial tort exception 
This exception applies to acts of a foreign state that take place in the territory of the forum state 
and cause death, personal injury or property damage. It is codified in both the European Convention 
on State Immunity and the UN Convention.42 National legislation, with the exception of Pakistan, 
reflects this exception.43 However, the existence and scope of this exception as a matter of 
customary international law remains controversial.44 The principle has developed to address the 
issue of insurable risks on the grounds that insurance companies should not benefit from state 
immunity.45 Hence, some states have limited its application to insurable risks.46 The particular issue 
  
37  United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (opened for signature 
17 January 2005, not yet in force), art 10 [UN Convention]. 
38  Van Alebeek, above n 17, at 49.   
39  Shaw, above n 5, at 697. 
40  At 749.   
41  Bornkamm, above n 22, at 779.  
42  European Convention on State Immunity 74 ETS (opened for signature 16 May 1972, entered into force 11 
June 1976), art 11; UN Convention, above n 37, art 12. 
43  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [4] per Gaja J.  
44  Van Alebeek, above n 17, at 69.  
45  Bornkamm, above n 22, at 776.  
46  At 779.  
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of relevance is whether this exception extends to the acts of the armed forces of a foreign state on 
the territory of the forum state during armed conflict.47   
2 Serious violations of jus cogens norms 
It has been contended that no immunity attaches to state acts that constitute serious violations of 
international law and which breach jus cogens norms.48 Jus cogens, or peremptory norms, are rules 
of customary international law from which no derogation is permitted and which cannot be set aside 
by treaty or agreement.49 In 2001, the International Law Commission identified the prohibitions of 
genocide, torture, slavery and the basic rules of IHL as examples of jus cogens norms.50 The 
contentious question is whether state immunity continues to attach to state acts that violate jus 
cogens norms. This question will be addressed in more detail in the following Parts of the article.  
III JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF THE STATE  
A Factual and Legal Matrix  
The proceedings before the ICJ originated during World War II. Between 1943 and 1945, 
Germany occupied much of the Italian and Greek territories. During this occupation, German armed 
forces committed serious violations of IHL, including the massacre of civilians and the deportation 
of civilians and members of the Italian armed forces to slave labour camps in Germany.51 The 
reparation regime established following World War II was not comprehensive and many of the 
victims of these crimes were not eligible for compensation.52 Excluded victims advanced civil 
claims in both Greek and Italian courts seeking compensation from the German state. It was the 
  
47  Roger O'Keefe "State Immunity and Human Rights: Heads and Walls, Hearts and Minds" (2011) 44 Vand J 
Transnatl L 999 at 1011; Christopher Keith Hall "UN Convention on State Immunity: The Need for a 
Human Rights Protocol" (2006) 55 ICLQ 411 at 422.  
48  See for example Alexander Orakhelashvili "State Immunity and Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of 
Lords Got It Wrong" (2007) 18 EJIL 955; Lorna McGregor "State Immunity and Jus Cogens" (2006) 55 
ICLQ 437.  
49  Brownlie, above n 10, at 510; Shaw, above n 5, at 124; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 
UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980), art 53:  
[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.  
50  Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session [2001] YILC 1, vol 2, pt 2 
at [40.5]; see also Shaw, above n 5, at 126; Brownlie, above n 10, at 489.   
51  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [52] per the majority. 
52  Bornkamm, above n 22, at 774. 
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successful procession of these claims in the Italian judicial system that gave rise to the case before 
the ICJ.   
1 Civil proceedings before Greek courts 
In the Distomo massacre of 1944, German armed forces killed between 200 and 300 Greek 
civilians.53 In 2000, the Hellenic Supreme Court in Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of 
Germany (Prefecture of Voiotia) ordered the German state to compensate relatives of the victims of 
this massacre. In doing so, the Court denied the German plea of jurisdictional state immunity.54 It 
reasoned that the territorial tort exception in art 11 of the European Convention on State Immunity 
reflected customary international law. This exception applied because the acts of the armed forces 
breached the jus cogens norms of IHL. As such, they were rendered an abuse of sovereign power 
and hence were not classifiable as acta jure imperii.55 In a later factually similar case, Margellos v 
Federal Republic of Germany (Margellos), the Greek Special Supreme Court reneged on this 
reasoning and held that Germany was entitled to jurisdictional immunity.56  
Germany refused to comply with the decision of Prefecture of Voiotia. Enforcement 
proceedings failed in Greece57 and Germany.58 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) also 
denied petitions by the victims against those states on the basis that any restriction on access to 
courts accorded with general international law and was, therefore, justified and proportionate.59   
The Greek claimants sought to enforce the judgment in Italy where favourable jurisprudence had 
developed simultaneously, as discussed below. Italian courts declared the damages award 
enforceable in Italy.60 This led the Greek claimants to register a legal charge over German state 
  
53  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [30] per the majority.  
54  Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany Hellenic Supreme Court 11, 4 May 2000, 129 ILR 
513. 
55  Xiaodong Yang "Absolute Immunity of Foreign Armed Forces from Tort Proceedings" (2012) 71 CLJ 282 
at 282; Fox, above n 3, at 583–585. 
56  Margellos v Federal Republic of Germany Greek Special Supreme Court 6, 17 September 2002, 129 ILR 
526. 
57  The Minister for Justice did not authorise the enforcement of the judgment. Such enforcement is required 
under the Greek Code of Civil Procedure; Ar 923 KPolD.  
58  Greek Citizens v Federal Republic of Germany (2003) NJW 3488 (BGH); 129 ILR 556.    
59  Kalogeropoulou v Greece and Germany (59021/00), Section I, ECHR 12 December 2002, 129 ILR 537.  
60  Repubblica Federale di Germania c Autogestione prefettizia di Voiotia Italian Court of Cassation  11163, 
12 January 2011.  
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property located in Italy.61 The execution of this charge was stayed, pending the forthcoming 
judgment of the ICJ.62  
2 Civil proceedings before Italian courts 
The starting point of the relevant Italian jurisprudence is the 2004 decision of the Italian Court 
of Cassation in Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany (Ferrini).63 Mr Ferrini, an Italian civilian 
deported to Germany and subjected to forced labour during World War II, had advanced a civil 
claim against the German state. The Court found Germany was not entitled to state immunity and 
upheld Mr Ferrini's claim. The Court reasoned that the acts were international crimes amounting to 
serious violations of jus cogens norms.64 The Court considered jus cogens norms were 
hierarchically superior to, and therefore prevailed over, state immunity.65 The Court also 
emphasised Mr Ferrini's right of access to justice. To recognise immunity would be to "hinder the 
protection of values whose safeguard is to be considered essential to the whole international 
community" and would be inconsistent with a systematic interpretation of international law.66 In 
later cases related to deportation and forced labour, the Court of Cassation confirmed this ruling and 
reasoning.67 
In 2008, the Court of Cassation in Germany v Milde considered a civil claim against the German 
state brought by the relatives of victims of civilians massacred by the German armed forces in 1944 
in Cornia, Italy.68 The Court again denied state immunity for international crimes and confirmed 
this as a "firm point" in its jurisprudence.69 The Ferrini reasoning was reiterated. The Court stressed 
the need to engage in a holistic interpretation of the international public order and recognise a 
hierarchy of values under which fundamental human rights take priority over immunity.70   
  
61  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [35] per the majority. 
62  Bornkamm, above n 22, at 776.  
63  Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany Italian Court of Cassation 5044, 11 March 2004, (2004) 87 RDI 
539, 128 ILR 659.  
64  At [9] and [11]. 
65  At [9]–[9.1]. 
66  At [9.1]–[9.2]. 
67  Federal Republic of Germany v Giovanni Mantelli and others Italian Court of Cassation 14201, 29 May 
2008, (2009) 134 FO 1568.  
68  Germany v Milde Italian Court of Cassation 1072, 21 October 2008, (2009) 92 RDI 618. 
69  At [3]–[4]. 
70  At [4]–[6].   
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B Arguments of the Parties 
1 Germany 
On 23 December 2008, Germany initiated proceedings against Italy before the ICJ.71 Germany 
alleged that Italy had violated its obligation at international law to accord Germany immunity from 
judicial proceedings in three ways: first, by allowing civil claims to be brought against Germany in 
Italian courts; second, by taking measures of constraint against German state property; and third, by 
declaring Greek judgments against Germany enforceable in Italy.72 In each instance, Germany 
argued that customary international law required jurisdictional immunity to be granted.73 Germany 
emphasised the limited scope of the territorial tort exception,74 and the incorrect ruling of the Italian 
Court of Cassation in the Ferrini jurisprudence on the relationship between state immunity and jus 
cogens norms.75 Germany also buttressed its position with policy arguments. It contended that a 
decision in favour of Italy would open the floodgates to litigants, render peace treaties meaningless, 
subject states to liability where liability had already been determined, and destabilise the 
international order.76   
2 Italy 
Italy disputed the German claim and argued it was under no obligation to accord Germany 
jurisdictional immunity in the circumstances.77 Italy advanced two primary arguments. First, the 
territorial tort exception applied to acts de jure imperii.78 Second, the circumstances and subject 
matter of the claims before the Italian courts justified the denial of immunity.79 Italy also 
emphasised that developments in international law, such as the increased relevance of the individual 
and of the right to access justice, had given rise to an obligation to lift state immunity if the claimant 
  
71  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [1] per the majority.    
72  At [16] per the majority.  
73  Federal Republic of Germany "Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany" (12 June 2009) International 
Court of Justice <www.icj-cij.org> at [115]–[130].  
74  At [71]–[82].  
75  At [83]–[90].  
76  At [112]–[114]. 
77  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [38] per the majority. 
78  At [62] per the majority.  
79  At [80] per the majority. 
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had no alternative avenues of redress. In those situations, granting immunity would be contrary to 
the fundamental values of the international community.80  
C Decision of the Court 
The Court found that Italy violated its obligation to accord Germany immunity in respect of 
each of Germany's three claims. First, by a majority of 12 to three, the ICJ held that Italy violated its 
obligation by allowing civil claims to be brought against Germany.81 Judges Cançado Trindade, 
Yusuf, and Gaja dissented on this point. Second, by a majority of 14 to one, the ICJ held that Italy 
violated its obligation by taking measures of constraint against German state property. Third, the 
same majority held that Italy violated its obligation by declaring Greek judicial decisions against 
Germany enforceable in Italy. Judge Cançado Trindade dissented on both the second and third 
finding.82 The reasoning of the Court in each of these three claims will now be presented.  
1 Civil claims advanced in Italian courts 
The Court emphasised it was concerned with the immunity of the state itself as opposed to the 
immunity of individual officers of the state.83 In this way, it distinguished this case from the law 
relating to the immunity of state officials in criminal proceedings,84 and from the judgment of the 
House of Lords in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 3) (Pinochet).85 
The Court recognised that, between the parties, state immunity was governed by international 
law as opposed to comity.86 As there were no applicable treaties,87 art 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute) required the Court to determine the existence of 
  
80  Italy "Counter Memorial of Italy" (22 December 2009) International Court of Justice <www.icj-cij.org> at 
61–70 and 73–78; relying, inter alia, on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law GA Res 60/147, A/Res/60/147 (2005) at [3.C] to support the emphasis on 
"effective access to justice" (emphasis added).  
81  The majority on this point consisted of President Owada; Vice-President Tomka; Judges Koroma, Simma, 
Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Greenwood, Xue and Donoghue. 
82  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [139] per the majority. 
83  At [87] and [91] per the majority.  
84  As addressed in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), above n 6.   
85  R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147 
(HL).  
86  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [53] per the majority.    
87  At [54] per the majority. 
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"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."88 The Court recalled that 
the criteria of a rule of customary international law included, as set out in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, "settled practice" in combination with opinio juris.89   
The Court noted that states generally accepted the restrictive doctrine of state immunity, which 
distinguished between acta jure gestionis and acta jure imperii.90 It acknowledged that states are 
"generally entitled to immunity in respect of acta jure imperii."91 The acts of the German armed 
forces, in the opinion of the Court, clearly constituted acta jure imperii, notwithstanding their 
illegality.92 The inquiry, therefore, turned to whether an exception was applicable.  
(a) The territorial tort exception 
The Court refrained from addressing the existence of a territorial tort exception to acta jure 
imperii at customary international law generally. Construing the issue narrowly, the Court focused 
solely on whether the tort exception negated immunity for acts committed by armed forces on the 
territory of the forum state during armed conflict.93 The Court addressed this question by way of a 
close examination of relevant state practice. International agreements, domestic legislation and 
municipal judicial decisions were considered.94  
The only uncontested state practice in support of the application of the tort exception was 
Italian. Greek state practice was contrary to the Italian contention even though the Hellenic Supreme 
Court held in Prefecture of Voiotia that the tort exception applied to the acts of armed forces during 
conflict. The reason was that the Greek Special Supreme Court, in Margellos,95 had later renounced 
the reasoning in Prefecture of Voiotia, and accorded Germany immunity for acts of its armed forces 
during armed conflict even where those acts were on Greek territory.96   
  
88  Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(b).  
89  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v 
Netherlands (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 44. 
90  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [59] per the majority. 
91  At [61] per the majority. 
92  At [60] per the majority; contrast with [178]–[181] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
93  At [64] per the majority.  
94  At [66]–[76] per the majority. 
95  Margellos v Federal Republic of Germany, above n 56.   
96  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [83] per the majority.  
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In the Court's opinion, state practice accompanied by opinio juris justified the finding that the 
territorial tort exception to state immunity did not apply to torts committed by armed forces during 
armed conflict.97   
(b) The circumstances and subject matter of the claims before the Italian courts 
Italy contended that the denial of immunity was justified because of the combined effect of the 
gravity of the offences which were the subject matter of the claims before the Italian courts, the jus 
cogens nature of the rules breached and the absence of alternative avenues of redress.98 The Court 
addressed the three strands of the Italian argument separately.  
(i) The gravity of the offences  
The Court held that the German acts were serious violations of the law of armed conflict and 
crimes under international law.99 However, the only state practice supporting an exception arising 
from the gravity of the offences was Italian. Moreover, state practice rejecting this exception was 
found in the national judicial decisions of six other states, including New Zealand.100 These 
decisions also revealed opinio juris by demonstrating that states have considered themselves bound 
by international law to reject the existence of this exception. The Court noted that the 1996 
Amendment to the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act removed immunity from states 
with respect to certain specified acts, such as torture, if those acts were performed by a state 
designated as a sponsor of terrorism.101 However, this legislative exception was considered an 
anomaly.102 The Court also referred to the absence of such a limitation in the UN Convention. This 
was very important in the Court's view because in 1999 the Working Group reported that the impact 
of serious violations of international law on the availability of immunity was "not ripe enough" to 
"engage in a codification exercise over it."103 This further indicated to the Court that state practice 
and opinio juris did not support such an exception. 
  
97  At [77] per the majority.  
98  At [80] per the majority.  
99  At [81] per the majority.  
100  At [85] per the majority; Fang v Jiang [2007] NZAR 420 (HC), in which a New Zealand resident sought 
damages against a former President of the People's Republic of China for alleged acts of torture suffered. 
The Court denied the claim, reasoning that torture gave rise to an exception to the principles of state 
immunity. 
101  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 USC §1605A.   
102  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [88] per the majority. 
103  At [89] per the majority. The Courts placed undue reliance on the report of the Working Group given that it 
significantly preceded the development of the Ferrini jurisprudence.  
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The Court concluded that, as a matter of customary international law, there was no exception to 
state immunity where the state committed serious violations of IHL.104 
(ii) Violation of jus cogens norms 
Italy also argued that immunity could not shield a state from jurisdiction with respect to 
breaches of jus cogens norms. It submitted that jus cogens prevailed over inconsistent rules of 
international law, such as state immunity. The Court assumed, for the purposes of argument, that the 
crimes breached jus cogens.105 However, in the opinion of the Court, the rules of jus cogens and 
those of state immunity did not conflict:106 
The rules of State immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining whether or not 
the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another State. They do not bear upon the 
question of whether or not the conduct in respect of which the proceedings are brought was lawful or 
unlawful. 
The Court considered state immunity to be procedural in nature.107 Thus, granting immunity did 
not equate to recognising a breach of jus cogens as lawful.108 Immunity was also an "entirely 
separate" issue to the international responsibility of a state and any obligation of reparation.109 
Moreover, the Court found nothing inherent in the concept of jus cogens that required a denial of the 
rules of immunity.110 
The Court also referred to judicial decisions in the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Slovenia, 
New Zealand, Greece and the ECtHR as instances in which a jus cogens exception had been denied. 
Once again, only Italian state practice supported the contrary position.111 Moreover, none of the 
domestic legislation outlined earlier limited immunity where jus cogens norms were violated.112 
The Court, therefore, concluded that customary international law accorded immunity even if the acts 
violated jus cogens norms.113  
  
104  At [91] per the majority.  
105  At [93] per the majority. 
106  At [93] per the majority.  
107  At [58] per the majority. 
108  At [93] per the majority. 
109  At [100] per the majority.  
110  At [95] per the majority. 
111  At [96] per the majority. 
112  At [96] per the majority.  
113  At [97] per the majority. 
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(iii) The absence of alternative redress  
The third strand of the Italian argument was that removal of immunity was justified in the 
absence of alternative compensatory mechanisms. The Court accepted that the claimants had 
exhausted all their alternative avenues for redress and that granting immunity to Germany may 
preclude redress for the victims.114 Nevertheless, it concluded there was "no basis in state practice 
from which customary international law is derived" that "makes the entitlement of a State to 
immunity dependent upon the existence of effective alternative means of securing redress."115   
(iv) The combined effect of the arguments 
Italy repeatedly emphasised during oral proceedings the unified nature of its argument: when 
taken together, the circumstances and subject matter of the claims before the Italian Courts justified 
a removal of immunity.116 The Court found that "nothing in the examination of state practice" 
supported that proposition and, therefore, dismissed this argument.117 
2 Measures of constraint taken against German property in Italy 
Germany's second claim alleged a breach of German state immunity from enforcement, as 
opposed to immunity from jurisdiction. These are separate and distinct doctrines.118 The Court held 
that, in the absence of express consent, a measure of constraint was only permitted over (but does 
not necessarily attach to) state property that is either used for commercial purposes or is specifically 
allocated for the satisfaction of a judicial claim.119 As the property in question was used entirely for 
non-commercial purposes, the legal charge violated the immunity from enforcement enjoyed by 
Germany under customary international law.120  
3 Declaring Greek decisions enforceable in Italy 
Germany's third claim alleged Italy breached German jurisdictional state immunity by declaring 
Greek decisions enforceable in Italy. The Court held that a court considering an application for the 
enforcement of a foreign judgment against a third state must ask whether, if the merits of the dispute 
had been before it, that court would have been obliged as a matter of international law to grant the 
  
114  At [104] per the majority. 
115  At [101] per the majority. 
116  At [105] per the majority.  
117  At [106] per the majority.  
118  At [113] per the majority.  
119  At [118] per the majority.  
120  At [120] per the majority. 
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third state immunity.121 The reasoning presented in relation to Germany's first claim therefore 
applied, and rendered the declaration of enforceability a violation of Germany's jurisdictional 
immunity.122  
IV A CRITIQUE OF THE REASONING AND METHODOLOGY 
This Part advances two primary arguments. The first concerns substance, the second concerns 
methodology. Thus it will be argued that, de lege lata, the Court reached the correct decision as to 
the current state of customary international law. It will then be argued that the majority was correct 
to employ a positivist methodology consisting of the thorough examination of state practice and 
opinio juris.  
A De Lege Lata: The Question of What the Law Is 
This analysis will first address the Court's discussion of the relationship between state immunity 
and jus cogens norms. It will then evaluate the Court's determination of the scope of customary 
international law by reference to state practice and opinio juris.   
1 The relationship between state immunity and jus cogens 
The Court's decision is significant for its ruling on the relationship between state immunity and 
jus cogens norms. Four points are to be noted. First, the Court defined a jus cogens rule as "one 
from which no derogation is permitted".123 This definition is not contentious. Second, the Court 
assumed for the purposes of argument that the violations of IHL by the German armed forces were 
violations of jus cogens rules.124 Third, the Court found acts that violate jus cogens norms may 
nevertheless constitute acta jure imperii for the purposes of the restrictive doctrine of state 
immunity.125 Fourth, and most importantly, the Court conceptualised rules of state immunity as 
procedural rather than substantive.    
Points one and two require no further comment. However, points three and four are important. 
The decision on the third point, the scope of acta jure imperii, is important because an argument has 
been advanced in other settings that immunity does not apply to violations of jus cogens  because 
they cannot be considered acta jure imperii.126 Thus the Court's decision that acts violating 
  
121  At [130] per the majority. 
122  At [131] per the majority. 
123  At [95] per the majority. 
124  At [93] per the majority. Although the Court indicated that at least some international humanitarian law 
[IHL] rules have the status of jus cogens, at [95] per the majority. Compare [98] per Cançado Trindade J 
dissenting: the rules of IHL at issue "belong[ed] to the domain of jus cogens." 
125  At [60] per the majority, [15] per Keith J and [4] per Koroma J. 
126  See Alexander Orakhelashvili Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006) at 326; Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany, above n 54, at 521.  
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international law could fall within the functions of the state was contrary to the finding of the United 
Kingdom House of Lords in Pinochet, and the reasoning in the Joint Separate opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000.127 It is also one of the 
issues on which Judge Cançado Trindade forcefully dissented. He argued that if jus cogens norms 
were violated, then the distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis became 
irrelevant. In his opinion, such acts were delicta imperii to which no immunity attached.128 His 
position was largely unsubstantiated, although it was reasoned that "a crime is a crime".129  
Fourth, and most significantly, the Court was very clear that, in its opinion, rules of state 
immunity are procedural whereas rules of jus cogens are substantive. This distinction was drawn in 
response to Italy's argument that jus cogens norms prevail over conflicting rules of international law 
because of their hierarchical superiority.130 The Court rejected the existence of a conflict between 
the procedural rules of state immunity and the substantive rules of jus cogens as "the two sets of 
rules address different matters."131 The Court relied upon this conceptualisation to deny an 
exception to state immunity arising by reason of the violation of jus cogens norms. This point was 
met with vigorous criticism from Judge Cançado Trindade. He critiqued the Court's reasoning as a 
"groundless deconstruction of jus cogens".132 For Judge Cançado Trindade, even if there was no 
formalistic conflict, there was a "material conflict" because immunity would deprive jus cogens 
norms of their legal effects.133 The argument was constructed by reference, inter alia, to the 
principle that "legal procedure is not an end in itself; it is a means to the realization of justice."134 
The separation of substantive and procedural law in this formalistic way would cause manifest 
injustice as, on these facts, it would leave victims without any alternative means of redress.  
Although this article will argue that, from a legal viewpoint, the majority reached the preferable 
decision, the distinction between procedural and substantive law is not without its problems. It has 
  
127  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, above n 6, at 88–89; Kimberley N Trapp and Alex Mills "Smooth Runs 
the Water where the Brook is Deep: The Obscured Complexities of Germany v Italy" (2012) 1 CJICL 153 at 
154. 
128  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [213] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
129  At [178]–[181] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
130  At [92] per the majority. 
131  At [93] per the majority. 
132  At [296] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
133  At [296] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
134  At [295] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
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been labelled a "purely theoretical construct" 135 and criticised for its "excessive formalism".136 The 
primary motivation for such criticism appears to be the resultant de facto impunity for serious 
violations of jus cogens.137 To deny the existence of a conflict of norms in a situation where a 
procedural norm prohibits the enforcement of a right arising from a substantive norm is to adopt a 
restrictive interpretation of "conflict of norms".138 Yet strictly speaking there is no conflict, just 
mere collision.139 Moreover, it is precisely a restrictive and conservative interpretation of 
international law that underpins the majority's reasoning throughout.140 Whether this is an 
appropriate approach for the ICJ will be discussed in later Parts. For now, it ought to be noted that 
the distinction drawn by the majority conforms with the views of leading international law scholars 
and is consistent with other areas of international law and existing ICJ jurisprudence on the 
question.  
First, the substantive/procedural distinction has been described as "one of the most fundamental 
concepts of legal exposition in both domestic and international law."141 It is also said to be "one of 
the truisms of international law."142 It is manifested in various ways across the broader tapestry of 
international law.143 It is also widely accepted in the writings "of the most highly qualified 
publicists".144 Professor Shaw stated "the question of sovereign immunity is a procedural one".145 
Similarly, Lady Hazel Fox advanced the view that:146  
  
135  Alexander Orakhelashivili "Peremptory Norms as an Aspect of Constitutionalisation in the International 
Legal System" in M Frishman and S Muller (eds) The Dynamics of Constutionalism  in the Age of Globalis-
ation (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2010) 153 at 165.  
136  McGregor, above n 7, at 911.  
137  Stefan Talmon "Jus Cogens after Germany v Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished" (2012) 
25 LJIL 979 at 981.  
138  François Boudreault "Identifying Conflicts of Norms: The ICJ Approach in the Case of Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) (2012) 25 LJIL 1003 at 1007. 
139  Talmon, above n 137, at 986.  
140 Bornkamm, above n 22, at 773.  
141  Talmon, above n 137, at 983.  
142  Antonio Cassese "When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on 
the Belgium v Congo case" (2002) 13 EJIL 853 at 869.  
143  Talmon, above n 137, at 986–1001.  
144  Statute of the International Court of Justice, above n 88, art 38(1)(d). 
145  Shaw, above n 5, at 700.  
146  Fox, above n 3, at 151. 
206 (2013) 44 VUWLR 
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to 
substantive law; it does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts 
any breach of it to a different method of settlement. 
Moreover, the ICJ has consistently adopted this conceptualisation. In Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo, the Court held that the jus cogens nature of a rule does not confer 
jurisdiction on the Court where jurisdiction would not otherwise exist.147 In Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000, the Court held that violations of norms that "undoubtedly posses[ed] the character of jus 
cogens,"148 did not impact the individual immunity of a Minister of Foreign Affairs because 
"jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature."149 The same distinction influenced the majority of 
the ECtHR in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom. The ECtHR in that instance held that "immunity is to be 
seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national courts' power to 
determine" the case.150 Although these decisions are not directly on point, they indicate continued 
recourse to the notion of a separation between procedural and substantive rules of international law. 
The Italian argument would nevertheless be persuasive if jus cogens norms inherently contained 
a procedural rule guaranteeing their enforcement. This argument has been advanced by Kerstin 
Bartsch and Bjorn Elberling.151 It rests on the proposition that jus cogens norms create obligations 
erga omnes: obligations owed to all states and in respect of which all states have a legal interest.152 
The authors conclude that jus cogens norms must, therefore, contain procedural elements preventing 
limitations to their enforcement.153 Other authors have opposed this conception of jus cogens, 
arguing that the universal jurisdiction arising from obligations erga omnes does not confer 
competence on courts which otherwise lack that competence: it merely "obliges the use of those 
means regularly available."154  
  
147  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Rwanda) (Provisional Measures) [2006] ICJ Rep 6 at 32 and 52.  
148  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [95] per the majority. 
149  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium), above n 6, at 24 and 25.  
150  Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 11 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [48].  
151  Kerstin Bartsch and Björn Elberling "Jus Cogens vs State Immunity; Round Two: The Decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al v Greece and Germany Decision" (2003) 4 
German LJ 477 at 487–488. 
152  Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v France) (Second Phase, Judgment) 
[1970] ICJ Rep 3 at 32.  
153  Bartsch and Elberling, above n 151, at 487.   
154  Van Alebeek, above n 17, at 352–354. See also Dalila Hoover "Universal Jurisdiction not so Universal: A 
Time to Delegate to the International Criminal Court" (2011) Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate 
Student Conference Papers, Paper 52, at 9–13 for a discussion of the impact of inadequate national 
legislation on the enforcement of obligations erga omnes.  
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The Court also rejected this approach.155 The Court is correct to deny any automatic link 
between a violation of jus cogens and a specific legal consequence.156 The ICJ held in East Timor 
that even obligations erga omnes are separate and distinct from procedural jurisdiction rules and 
thus cannot override such rules.157 The Court also rejected the similar argument that rights and 
obligations arising from the violation of jus cogens norms are of a peremptory character. Although 
this argument had gained traction before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, it was not 
supported by state practice or accepted principle.  
In confirming that the rules of state immunity and jus cogens are distinct and do not conflict, the 
Court made a significant contribution to the law of state immunity and jus cogens. 
2 Customary international law as determined by state practice and opinio juris 
The Court relied on an extensive survey of state practice and opinio juris. It will now be argued 
that the reasoning of the Court in this regard was sound. 
The Court proceeded on a correct understanding of the dual elements of customary international 
law: state practice and opinio juris. A rule of customary international law will be recognised where 
state practice is "settled" among those states "whose interests are specifically affected"158 by the 
purported customary international law, although there is no requirement of "absolute rigorous 
conformity."159 There is also the requirement of opinio juris: states must have a subjective belief 
that their practice is obligated under international law.160 
The Court undertook a thorough, detailed and accurate analysis of state practice and opinio juris. 
As identified by the Court, there is almost unified state practice rejecting the applicability of the 
territorial tort exception to immunity for acts of armed forces during conflict.161 The Court cites 
equally compelling evidence that state practice denies an exception to immunity in civil claims 
  
155  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [95] per the majority. 
156  Thilo Rensmann "Impact on the Immunity of States and Their Officials" in Menno T Kamminga and Martin 
Scheinin (eds) The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009) 151 at 161. 
157  East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90 at 102. 
158  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v 
Netherlands), above n 89, at 43 and 44. 
159  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) [1986] 
ICJ Rep 14 at 98. 
160  Shaw, above n 5, at 84.   
161  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [91] per the majority.   
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relating to serious violations of IHL and jus cogens norms even where there are no alternative means 
of redress available.162   
The Court is correct to point out that the only municipal jurisprudence to the contrary is that of 
Italy. The Greek jurisprudence ought not to be accorded significant weight because taken as a whole 
it refutes, rather than supports, the Italian contention. As explained earlier, this is the case even 
though Prefecture of Voiotia itself supports Italian state practice.163   
The purported exception cannot be grounded in national legislation either. At the time of the 
judgment, the only exception was the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.164 Canada 
has since legislated to create a similar exception.165 However, the Court is correct to attach little 
weight to the relevance of this legislation. First, state practice is not required to be in absolute 
conformity.166 Moreover, the exceptions are political in nature as the only states that can be sued are 
those that the United States and Canadian Executives identify as sponsors of terrorism.167   
In contrast to the thorough analysis provided by the Court, the dissenting judgments failed to 
consider the issue of state practice adequately or, in some cases, at all. For example, dissenting 
Judge Yusuf disagreed that state practice supported Germany's position. In his opinion, "state 
immunity is, as a matter of fact, as full of holes as Swiss cheese." However, no specific examples of 
the alleged extensive uncertainty were cited.168 It can be concluded that Judge Yusuf was 
overstating the matter. It is acknowledged that uncertainty as to the distinction between acta jure 
gestionis and acta jure imperii exists in state practice.169 However, this distinction was not at issue 
before the Court. With the exceptions of Italian jurisprudence and North American legislation, the 
state practice relating to the issues before the Court was consistent. Judge Cançado Trindade 
characterised state practice as "sparse". This led him to conclude that state practice could not 
prevent the negation of state immunity in cases of grave breaches of jus cogens.170 However, 
although the state practice considered by the Court is not universal, it is uniform across those states 
  
162  At [96] per the majority.  
163  At [76] per the majority.  
164  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 28 USC §1605A.   
165  Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act 2012 amending the 1985 State Immunity Act RSC 1985 c s 18.  
166  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), above n 159, at 
98. 
167  Andrea Gattini "The Dispute on Jurisdictional Immunities before the ICJ: Is the Time Ripe for a Change of 
the Law?" (2011) 24 LJIL 173 at 174.  
168  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [26] per Yusuf J.  
169  Bankas, above n 15, at 95; Fox, above n 3, at 503. 
170  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [294] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
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whose interests are specifically affected by the matter. As the ICJ held in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf cases, that is sufficient for the identification of customary international law.171 
It is, therefore, concluded that the majority reached a correct decision as to what the law is, de 
lege lata.   
B An Evaluation of Methodology 
Dissenting Judge Cançado Trindade noted that there "seems to be an abyss separating [his] 
position from that of the Court's majority".172 This is particularly true with respect to the 
methodology of each judgment. A comparative analysis of each methodology will now be 
undertaken, leading to the conclusion that the positivist approach of the majority is, from a legal 
point of view, more appropriate than Judge Cançado Trindade's value-based dissent.  
The Court reached a decision primarily by recourse to an extensive survey of relevant state 
practice. The methodology was systematically positivistic and source orientated. The underlying 
question addressed was what the law is as opposed to what the law ought to be. Judge Koroma 
explicitly emphasised that "the Court's judgment applies the law as it exists today."173 The absence 
of modal verbs such as "ought" and "should" in the judgment also reflects this approach. The ICJ 
has been criticised for rarely engaging in an "extensive analysis of State practice, let alone 
extending that to the practice of domestic courts."174 In this respect, the comprehensive survey of 
state practice and opinio juris conducted by the Court is noteworthy and ought to be commended.  
Nevertheless, this positivist methodology was criticised by the dissenting judges. In particular, 
Judge Yusuf argued that uncertainty in the law ought not to be resolved by a "formalistic counting 
exercise of the sparse and conflicting decisions on the matter."175 In his view, international law is 
not "a question of relative numbers."176 Judge Cançado Trindade similarly lamented that the 
judgment was "over-attentive to facts and oblivious of values."177 As identified earlier, the 
dissenting judgments were not grounded in an analysis of state practice. Instead, as Judge Cançado 
Trindade recognised, they placed greater importance on recourse to "issues of principle and 
  
171  North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v 
Netherlands), above n 89, at 43. 
172  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [228] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
173  At [7] per Koroma J. 
174  Andre Nollkaemper "The Role of Domestic Courts in the Case Law of the International Court of Justice" 
(2006) 5 Chinese JIL 301 at 304; Arthur Mark Weisburd "The International Court of Justice and the 
Concept of State Practice" (2009) 31 U Pa J Intl L 295 at 368. 
175  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [27] per Yusuf J dissenting.  
176  At [24] per Yusuf J dissenting.  
177  At [293] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
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fundamental values".178 Judge Cançado Trindade adopted an approach akin to that of natural 
legalism and determined the dispute by reference to values such as the realisation of justice and 
fairness.179 His progressive and normative assessment of the merits of the case stands in stark 
contrast to the approach of the majority.180  
The unwillingness of the Court to engage in the progressive development of the law has 
surprised few international law commentators given the Court's traditionally conservative 
judgments.181 Yet it ought to be noted that the judicial activism manifest in Judge Cançado 
Trindade's dissent is neither unique nor unexpected. Although the ICJ generally avoids making 
decisions on the basis of advancing "large scheme purposes", judges who render separate or 
dissenting opinions have often adopted such a methodology.182 These judges conceive their judicial 
function as one of advancing public values.183 For example, Judge Manfred Lachs in 1992 
characterised the ICJ as "the guardian of legality for the international community."184 Judge 
Cançado Trindade's approach is not unexpected given his background as President of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: an institution described as unique for its humanisation and 
moralisation of international law.185  
The starting point for Judge Cançado Trindade was that serious breaches of IHL violated jus 
cogens. They, therefore, generated state responsibility and an individual's right to reparation. In 
order to protect the ultimate principle of the realisation of justice, state immunity was refused for 
grave breaches of jus cogens.186 Fundamentally, he sought to "secure the ongoing evolution of 
international law upon humanist foundations."187 This naturalistic methodology reflects his belief 
  
178  At [300] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
179  Randy E Barnett "Toward a Theory of Legal Naturalism" (1978) 2 J Libertarian Stud 97 at 98.   
180  Trapp and Mills, above n 127, at 164.  
181  At 164.  
182  Fuad Zarbiyev "Judicial Activism in International Law – A Conceptual Framework for Analysis" (2012) 3 J 
Int Disp Settlement 247 at 259. 
183  At 254. 
184  Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of America) (Provisional Measures) [1992] 
ICJ Rep 3 at 26; see also Judge Christopher Weeramantry in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at 533, who referred to the "moralities of the matter and 
the interest of humanity." 
185  Ludovic Hennebel "The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Ambassador of Universalism" (2011) 
RQDI Special Edition 57 at 76–87. 
186  Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, above n 1, at [129], [227] and [297] per Cançado Trindade J 
dissenting.  
187  At [224] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.   
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that legal positivism is "shortsighted" and an inappropriate method of resolving international legal 
disputes.188 In his opinion, "law and ethics go ineluctably together."189 He opined that this 
relationship must manifest in the reasoning of the Court if the importance of fundamental human 
values and the attainment of justice are to be realised.190 It must be this concern that led the Judge to 
contend that in order to fulfill its function as "the principle judicial organ of the United Nations" the 
ICJ must, at times, go beyond the formal sources of international law listed in art 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute.191  
The suggestion that the ICJ should go beyond the wording of art 38(1) in resolving a legal 
dispute is open to criticism. First, the ICJ has repeatedly emphasised that its function is to state 
existing law and only decide on the basis of law.192 It must follow that any decision of the Court can 
only derive legitimacy by limiting its reasoning to the formal sources of law. Professor Shaw has 
noted that art 38(1) "is widely recognised as the most authoritative and complete statement as to the 
sources of international law."193 There is no indication that ethics or fundamental values ought to be 
relevant, in and of themselves, in the resolution of a legal dispute before the ICJ. Yet, Judge 
Cançado Trindade's reasoning expressly incorporated ethics and was guided primarily by recourse 
to fundamental values.   
  
188  At [150] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
189  At [289] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting. 
190  At [289] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
191  At [149] per Cançado Trindade J dissenting.  
192  Shaw, above n 5, at 1065–1066; See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Merits) [1974] 
ICJ Rep 3 at 19; Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objections) [1963] ICJ 
Rep 15 at 33; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
(Judgment) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 at 190.  
193  Shaw, above n 5, at 1065; Brownlie, above n 10, at 5; Statute of the International Court of Justice, above n 
88, art 38(1): 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law. 
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The ICJ ought not to be guided by a subjective evaluation of ethical values. Judge Cançado 
Trindade provided an example of judicial activism that is inappropriate in the ICJ given it has the 
primary function not of law-making but of applying law to settle disputes.194 For this reason, the 
positivist methodology advanced by the Court is to be commended. The ascertainment of what the 
law ought to be should fall outside the role of the ICJ as it is an international judicial body existing 
in a decentralised international legal order which accords sovereign states formal independence and 
equality.195  
The methodology of the dissenting judgments could be legitimised by conceptualising the focus 
on values as an identification of "general principles of law" in accordance with art 38(1)(c). 
However, general principles cannot be derived from purely ethical considerations. This is because 
the intention of art 38(1)(c) is to "authorise the Court to apply general principles of municipal 
jurisprudence … in so far as they are applicable to relations of States."196 It was not intended to 
create a "gateway for principles of natural law."197 Moreover, general principles were included in 
the ICJ Statute to serve a gap-filling function in situations where the customary law was unclear.198 
The customary international law on state immunity in cases of violations of jus cogens is not 
unclear.  
Even if conceptualised as recourse to general principles, the methodology of Judge Cançado 
Trindade remains only partially legitimate, and arguably unnecessary, in the current dispute. If the 
position at customary international law can be determined by an analysis of state practice and opinio 
juris, then a formal positivist approach such as that adopted by the Court in this instance is required.  
V WHAT OUGHT THE LAW TO BE? DE LEGE FERENDA 
This Part addresses the issue of de lege ferenda: what the state of customary international law 
ought to be. This discussion is to be distinguished from that relating to what the Court ought to have 
decided, or what municipal courts ought to decide in light of the judgment. Instead, it proceeds with 
a reference to policy considerations and recent developments in the international legal order to 
propose that, in the future, the law ought to contain a narrow exception to state immunity from 
  
194  Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
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jurisdiction for serious breaches of jus cogens norms where there are no alternative avenues of 
redress.  
A Policy Arguments 
Germany advanced two policy arguments rejecting the proposed exception. Both were 
motivated by the concern that it would undermine the stability of the international legal system. 
First, all peace settlements would be destabilised by the possibility of subsequent individual claims 
for compensation. Second, weakened states would be subject to near limitless liability.199   
Neither argument withstands scrutiny. First, a removal of immunity does not, per se, confer 
jurisdiction on domestic courts.200 Often, it has been argued that there is a need to establish a 
territorial link between the cause of action and the forum state.201 Moreover, the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens allows courts to stay proceedings if it is more appropriate that the case be heard in 
another forum.202 Second, the requirement of the exhaustion of all alternative remedies would 
prevent the floodgates from opening and thereby mitigate the "near limitless liability."203 This is 
because the resources required to exhaust all alternative avenues would necessarily prevent many 
otherwise eligible victims from bringing a claim.204 Third, a state may remain immune from 
enforcement proceedings even when subject to jurisdiction. The Court confirmed that in the absence 
of consent a state will be immune from enforcement unless the property at issue is used for a 
commercial purpose or is specifically allocated for the satisfaction of a judicial claim.205 Thus 
immunity from enforcement is distinct from, and far exceeds, jurisdictional immunity.206 Such 
immunity would prevent the destabilisation of the international order.   
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Moreover, the proposed exception would protect and enhance the rights of access to justice and 
to an effective remedy.207 It would also assist in the removal of impunity for serious violations of 
international law.208 Policy, therefore, supports rather than opposes the proposed exception. 
B Developments in the International Legal Order 
The proposed exception would align state immunity with recent developments in the 
international legal order. This is an order that is no longer purely state-centric. Respect for state 
sovereignty is no longer the fundamental value of the international legal order.209 The individual has 
risen to prominence.210 The increasing recognition of obligations erga omnes is one example of the 
movement away from a conception of sovereignty as a shield by which states can avoid 
accountability for serious international crimes.211 In 2006 the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe asserted that "international law should not regard it as contrary to the dignity or sovereign 
equality of nations to respond to claims against them or their agents."212 Furthermore, the focus on 
collective as opposed to individual reparation for serious violations of fundamental rights has been 
rendered historical by the Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 2005.213 Developments such as these do not suffice to establish an 
emerging exception to state immunity. However, the scope and impact of state immunity ought to be 
re-evaluated to reflect these developments and the contemporary meaning of sovereignty given that 
state immunity derives from sovereignty.214 As noted by Maria Gavouneli, immunity is "a classic 
subject of international law in perennial need of adjustment to contemporary notions of State and the 
rule of law."215   
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The evolution of state immunity to accommodate a development in the international legal order 
would not be unprecedented.216 As states featured more prominently in the commercial sphere, 
national courts created the commercial exception and adopted the restrictive doctrine of state 
immunity. The normative effects of sovereignty "were reappraised to give way to basic 
considerations of fairness."217 A similar reappraisal ought to occur so as to protect those victims of 
serious breaches of jus cogens who are without alternative means of redress. Crucially, however, the 
commercial exception arose from state practice and not by the activism of an international judicial 
body. The same evolutionary process ought to occur to create an exception from immunity for 
violations of jus cogens in the absence of alternative remedies. Importantly, as the issue is one of 
customary international law, such an evolution must arise out of state practice and opinio juris, not 
at the prerogative of an international judiciary. 
VI THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 
It has been observed that "state immunity is one of the fastest evolving fields of international 
law."218 This article will now assess the likely effect of the Court's judgment on the evolution of the 
proposed exception. Concurring Judge Koroma stated that the judgment does not "prevent the 
continued evolution of the law on State immunity" because it only applied the law as it exists 
today.219 Yet, the very act of measuring the current state of the law will inevitably influence its 
future.220 As recognised by the former President of the ICJ, Judge Higgins, "the very determination 
of specific disputes … does develop international law."221   
A Reception of the Judgment in Italy 
The ICJ Statute provides that decisions are binding "between the parties and in respect of that 
particular case."222 Article 94(1) of the Charter of the United Nations places an obligation on "each 
Member of the United Nations … to comply with the decision of [the Court] in any case to which it 
is a party".223 The decision of the ICJ binds Italy to "ensure that the decisions of its courts … 
infringing the immunity which the Federal Republic of Germany enjoys under international law 
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cease to have effect".224 However, the Court stated that the good faith of the wrongful state can be 
presumed and, therefore, did not formally order injunctive relief.225 The ICJ opined that "there is no 
reason to suppose that a State whose act or conduct has been declared wrongful by the Court will 
repeat that act or conduct in the future."226 Italy's international responsibility for a violation of its 
legal obligations is engaged with respect to the disputed jurisprudence.227 Should Italy fail to 
perform its obligations under this judgment, Germany may, in accordance with art 94(2) of the 
Charter of the United Nations, seek the assistance of the Security Council to enforce the 
judgment.228 
These factors suggest that the Italian judiciary will renege on its previously "firm" position.229 
This is supported by statements of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Court's ruling 
confirms a principle of international law and that "Italy will open a consultation process with 
Germany to resolve the question of the failure to pay compensation for the Italian victims of the 
Nazi massacres."230 However, this reception of the judgment cannot be taken for granted. Italian 
courts are yet to consider the effects of an ICJ judgment on Italian law.231 Moreover, the Court of 
Cassation has recently confirmed that fundamental constitutional norms, such as the right to judicial 
redress for violations of rights, prevail over customary international law.232 Thus it is likely, 
although not certain, that the Italian judiciary will accord Germany state immunity in factually 
similar cases in the future.  
B Reception of the Judgment in Other States 
The jus cogens exception to state immunity only ever gained momentum in Italian 
jurisprudence. In light of the preceding analysis the continued development of a jus cogens 
exception appears unlikely. Yet, it is the reception of the judgment in domestic courts of other states 
that will determine the immediate future of the law of immunity.  
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Recourse to the judgment in domestic judicial decisions could hinder the evolution of the law by 
generating a "customary international legal feedback loop".233 Roger O'Keefe identified this 
phenomenon in the context of judgments of the ECtHR. In Al-Adsani v United Kingdom,234 and 
Kalogeropoulou v Greece and Germany (Kalogeropoulou),235 the ECtHR held that, as a matter of 
customary international law, state immunity barred jurisdiction in proceedings for compensation in 
respect of personal injury or death caused by the violation of international law by a foreign state. 
These judgments have been relied upon by almost all members of the Council of Europe as 
authority for the obligation to accord jurisdictional immunity in such cases.236 Consequently, future 
decisions of the ECtHR are likely to conclude that customary international law requires immunity in 
these circumstances.237 This is notwithstanding the express statement in Kalogeropoulou that the 
judgment "does not preclude a development in customary international law in the future."238 
Domestic courts tasked with determining whether state immunity attaches to serious violations 
of IHL may rely on the judgment of the ICJ to find that, as a matter of customary international law, 
they are obliged to grant immunity. These decisions would add to the state practice of denying a jus 
cogens exception. This would influence future decisions as to the state of customary international 
law. The cycle could continue on in perpetuity.  
Whether this "feedback loop" eventuates will depend on whether domestic judges are in fact 
influenced by the judgment of the ICJ. In general, ICJ judgments are authoritative. Professor Shaw 
has noted that its comments as to the state of the law "are of the highest authority."239 The United 
States Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law specifies that the "judgments and opinions of the 
International Court of Justice are accorded great weight."240 Reasoning by recourse to judgments of 
the ICJ is common in the decisions of national courts.241 Such reasoning is evident in the House of 
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Lords judgment in Jones v Minister of Interior of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.242 Lord Bingham noted 
that in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the ICJ had "made plain that a breach of [a] 
jus cogens norm of international law does not suffice to confer jurisdiction."243 That persuaded Lord 
Bingham to find that such a breach does not "automatically override all other rules of international 
law."244 With respect to the present case, the statement made by Greece that the decision "will guide 
Greek courts in this regard" is testimony to the influence of the ICJ over states that are not 
technically bound by its judgments.245  
In theory then, domestic courts will look to the Court's judgment as a guide for similar cases in 
the future.246 Thus, the decision appears likely to abate the evolution of the law of state 
immunity.247 Yet, it must be remembered that in the field of state immunity the primary actors are 
courts, not governments. Courts, as contrasted with governments, are more likely to be guided by 
fundamental concerns of justice.248 As noted by Kirby J, some judges "tend to be more concerned 
than others about protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms."249 Hence, domestic courts 
may decide to accord little weight to the decision or go to great lengths to distinguish the case on the 
facts. It is also possible that courts will be influenced to develop an exception to state immunity 
drawing on Judge Cançado Trindade's dissent. The following words of Chief Justice Hughes of the 
United States Supreme Court perfectly capture the nature and potential effect of Judge Cançado 
Trindade's dissent:250  
A dissent in a court of last resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a 
future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes 
the Court to have been betrayed. 
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Whether judges of the future will align with the dissenting opinion is a question that only time 
can answer. For the moment it can certainly be concluded that the judgment has the potential to be a 
powerful restraint on the evolution of the law of state immunity.251 
VII CONCLUSION 
This article has evaluated the recent decision of the ICJ in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. 
The Court approached the case with a conservative and positivistic interpretation of international 
law. It held that customary international law continues to accord state immunity to serious violations 
of jus cogens norms by armed forces during conflict. The judgment is likely to influence domestic 
courts and, therefore, risks reinforcing the status quo and restraining the development of a jus 
cogens exception to state immunity. An exception to state immunity where there are no alternative 
means of redress for victims of serious violations of jus cogens norms would be desirable. However, 
it is critical that any further exception arises from state practice rather than international judicial 
activism. In the short term at least, the jus cogens exception to state immunity will remain governed 
by customary international law. The decision of the ICJ is, therefore, of utmost significance.  
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